Although electoral malapportionment is a recurrent theme in monitoring reports on African elections, few researchers have tackled this issue. Here we theorize the meaning and broader implications of malapportionment in eight African countries with Single Member District (SMD) electoral systems. Using a new dataset on registered voters and constituency level election results, we study malapportionment's magnitude, persistence over time, and electoral consequences. The analysis reveals that patterns of apportionment institutionalized in the pre-1990 era established a long-lasting bias in favor of rural voters. This "rural bias" has been strikingly stable in the post-1990 era, even where the ancien regime has been voted out of power. These findings underscore the importance of the urban-rural distinction in explaining electoral outcomes in Africa.
Introduction
Although the problem of electoral malapportionment is a recurrent theme in external monitoring missions' reports on African elections, few academic researchers have tackled this issue. Election monitoring reports from around Africa have frequently pointed out that unequal representation due to malapportionment violates the principle of 'one person one vote,' 1 and a seminal study by Barkan et al (2006) revealed the importance of rural-favoring ("rural-biased") malapportionment for Kenyan elections in the 1990s. Yet so far, scholars have lacked systematic comparative research on the magnitude of electoral malapportionment in Africa, its origins and persistence over time, and its consequences for electoral representation. This paper addresses these three gaps in our understanding of African political systems.
This paper identifies rural-favoring malapportionment in Single Member District (SMD) systems as a long-standing bias in electoral system design. We identify and measure this phenomenon in eight countries in Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa using an original dataset. The analysis provides clear evidence of rural-favoring or rural-biased malapportionment in our sample, showing that it pre-dates Africa's return to multipartism of the 1990s and has persisted largely unmitigated throughout the multiparty era, even where opposition parties have come to power. The results call for rethinking the oft repeated claim that regimes of the one-party era represented a "core coalition of urban interests" (Bates et al, 2007) while maintaining few links with the rural areas (Herbst 2000) , thus leaving rural peasantries "uncaptured by the state" (Hyden 1980 ). Mamdani (1996; 295) summarized the prevailing scholarly wisdom of the mid-1990s: the rural masses were viewed as an invisible, residual factor in politics, largely outside the purview of state action and control. These ideas live on in recent work that invokes the idea of the uncaptured or excluded rural masses as the historical baseline against which current patterns of rural voting are understood. Our results "bring rural electorates back in" to analyses of national politics by providing evidence of a long-established rural bias in African electoral systems which have, for many decades, drawn rural voters into national political systems as electoral bases for incumbents. Rural bias in electoral systems is highly significant because it dilutes the electoral weight of the cities, which are the locus of stronger opposition parties, more robust civil society organization, and more robust electoral competition. The paper's findings thus have implications for understanding both development and democracy in Africa.
The paper introduces a new dataset of constituency-level election data for eight
African countries since about 1990. There is a great paucity of such data, and it remains difficult to gather subnational electoral results across African countries and over time.
The dataset we have created is unique and our analysis is one of the very first to compare the structure and characteristics of constituency-level representation across African countries. While the data are descriptive, they allow us to draw some significant inferences about the origins, persistence, and effects of rural bias in electoral representation. And although it is limited to only eight countries, we believe our data set offers possibilities for significant new thinking about spatial and socio-economic structure in national voting patterns in Africa, and about how these patterns have taken shape and persisted over time.
Across our eight country cases, there is striking stability for 1990-2010 in both the extent and direction of rural bias in electoral apportionment. This is the main finding and empirical core of this paper. Four of the eight countries in our sample have experienced electoral turnover since the 1990s, but even in these countries (two of which have undertaken constituency demarcation exercises since the turnover), malapportionment favored rural districts as much as it did in the 2000s as it did in the early 1990s.
The argument is presented in five steps. First, we discuss elections under the oneparty and one-party-dominant regimes of the pre-1990 era. The historical record and secondary literatures provide clues to political rationales that help explain the rise and persistence of rural bias in Africa's ancien regime (pre-1990) electoral systems. Second, we introduce our data set, including our case-selection rationale. Third, for the eight countries in our study, we document the extent of malapportionment in the early 1990s
and how it has evolved since then. Fourth, we demonstrate malapportionment in the bias against the largest cities in our eight countries in the 2000s, and track change since 1990
in the extent to which incumbents have drawn disproportionately on rural voters to win elections. Fifth, focusing on the period since 1990, we correlate electoral district size with the constituency characteristics and voting patterns using fixed effect regression models. Here the data offer insight into the effects of rural bias on electoral representation. The conclusion returns to the question of political rationales that may drive rural-bias in electoral systems in Africa and beyond. It also discusses broad implications of these findings for the study African politics.
I. Elections under single-and dominant-party rule
Much political science work on Africa since the 1990s has conveyed the impression that that before multipartism, rural populations were absent from the national political stage. Although one-party and dominant-party regimes rested atop mass political parties and held regular elections, scholars often dismissed these as relevant to understanding dynamics in African countries. Many suggested that the mass parties existed in name only (or to provide positions for urban elites) and that nation-wide elections were empty rituals. In 1979 Naomi Chazan (1976: 136) wrote that the conventional wisdom among political scientists concerned with Africa is that elections were insignificant ("a non-phenomenon") on the Africa scene.
A wave of comparative politics research on elections and electoral institutions in authoritarian regimes suggests important correctives to this view, and insights into how and why legislatures, parties, and elections can matter for political stability and statebuilding, even in the absence of multiparty competition. As Lust-Okar (2005), Brownlee (2007), Gandhi (2008) and others show, even dictators invest scarce resources in gathering and maintaining power --they build political institutions, incorporate populations into national political systems, and seek legitimacy. Successful nondemocratic rulers can use political parties and elections to incorporate constituencies into stable ruling blocs or coalitions, gain information about subjects' demands and capabilities, economize on use of coercion, lower the cost of side payments and pay offs, impede the ability of opposition groups to coordinate against the center, and generate legitimacy (Olson 2000) These strategies were employed by the authoritarian and dominant party regimes in Africa, just as they were in the Middle East, Latin America and 19 th century Europe.
In the first three decades after independence from colonial rule, almost all civilian governments in Africa maintained elected legislatures. Chazan (1979:136) reported that between mid-1974 and mid-1978, for example, 26 African countries held elections and that voters went to the polls in these countries 47 times. Rulers organized elections and sought to use and control them. Many African governments used competitive legislative primaries as a device for elite monitoring, recruitment, and turnover (Zolberg et al. 1972; Widner 2000) . Party hierarchies organized relations of patronage and clientelism down to the regional and local levels, rallied supportive constituencies, and allowed rulers to exert control over the institutions of territorial administration. In countries in which rural populations made up anywhere from 60 to 90% of the national total, political party machines helped rulers secure rural acquiescence and compliance, and mobilized constituencies to turn-out to vote for incumbents at election time. Large literatures from the 1960s and 1970s show how non-democratic rulers used rural clientelism and local party-state institutions to undercut the political solidarities and oppositional tendencies that existed in peasant societies in Africa, and that could be turned against the center.
Bates ' (1981) analysis of machine politics in the rural areas of Kenya (a country with a bitter history of rural insurgency in the 1950s) reinforced precisely this argument.
Research on the role of legislatures in contemporary multiparty Africa has been inconclusive. Accounts on African democracy in the early 1990s highlighted the general concentration of power around the president, an institutional order that is in accordance with the political culture of "big man rule" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997 (Kollman et al. 2013 ), but these datasets do not offer good coverage and updated data for Sub-Saharan Africa.
In this paper we introduce a new dataset of constituency level lower-house parliamentary election results, registered voters, and constituency characteristics over the 1991-2010 period in eight African countries, Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Most of the data was gathered on a countryby-country basis from official accounts issued by the respective countries' national election commissions. In some cases data has also been found in election monitoring reports or national media. To the best of our knowledge, the dataset represents the most extensive account of constituency level election results in Anglophone African SMD elections. The rationale for our case-selection is presented in the next section.
A limitation of our dataset is that malapportionment is calculated based on the number of registered rather than eligible voters. Unfortunately, this is a problem we share with most of the existing cross-national research on malapportionment (e.g. Samuels and Snyder 2001; Broz and Maliniak 2010) , as census data is rarely readily available at the constituency level. If levels of registration in the countries in our sample are higher among rural voters than they are among urban voters, as several studies on African electoral systems do suggest, then our measure of rural bias in malapportionment would actually underestimate the rural bias in apportionment.
In addition to electoral data on the partisan breakdown of the vote and the number of registered voters per constituency, we coded constituencies as urban or rural.
Following Ishiyama et al. (2013) , we coded all constituencies located within the administrative boundaries of major cities as urban. 2 National and regional capitals with at least 20,000 citizens were considered "major cities," together with all other top 10-cities that met a population threshold of 20,000.
III. Case selection and data limitations
This is the first study researching African electoral malapportionment over time and across countries. Our study focuses on eight countries in Anglophone Africa, and although we cannot prove that our empirical results are representative of all the 17
African countries holding SMD elections in 2010 (for want of complete data), 3 we are confident that we have indentified a phenomenon of regional scope and indeed, as discussed in the conclusion, one that is consistent with patterns observed in many democracies outside of Africa that have large agrarian populations.
Case selection was determined on basis of competitiveness of elections, data availability and institutional continuity. We limited our sample to eight countries with SMD elections that exhibited at least a minimal degree of competitiveness (i.e., opposition parties received less than 10% of parliamentary seats) for two or more consecutive elections, and for which we could obtain data for several elections. Snyder (2001) used data from the 1990s (i.e. the beginning of Africa's multiparty era), to study cross-national variation in levels of malapportionment. They found that some of the 5 We have, however, included the 1996 Zambia election despite the boycott of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), although this was clearly an important boycott the opposition did receive almost 40% of the parliamentary vote. 6 The opposition never received more than 2.5% of the seats in these elections. 7 Samuels and Snyder (2001 ) show that malapportionment levels are significantly higher in countries with SMD elections.
world's most malapportioned electoral systems were on the African continent. To measure malapportionment, we rely on their formula:
(1) MAL= ( The second important conclusion drawn from figure 1 is that high levels of malapportionment have persisted over time. Patterns of change in country levels of malapportionment in figure 1 can be considered in light of the information in Table 1 , which indicates the timing and extent of post-independence demarcation exercises for the countries of our sample.
[ Figure 1 about here]
What does this data allow us to say about the origins of these patterns of malapportionment? On the eve of the return to multipartism in the 1990s, all countries in our sample were divided into electoral constituencies that were established by ancien regime parties in an era of one-party or dominant-party rule. Biases in ancien regime levels apportionment must be attributed, at least in part, to rulers' preferences --Africa's post-independence autocrats were in a strong position to structure patterns of malapportionment in ways that suited their interests. [ Table 1 about here]
V. Malapportionment and rural bias
To give a systematic and comparable illustration of the electoral weight given to urban and rural constituencies across our sample and over time, figure 2 shows the ratio between the average number of registered voters in rural and urban constituencies. Ratios above 1 indicate urban overrepresentation while ratios below 1 shows rural overrepresentation. The figure shows a striking and largely persistent level of rural overrepresentation in six out of the eight countries in our sample. Five of the eight countries had a ratio of below 0.6 in at least one election. Kenya, Zambia, Ghana and to an increasing extent Malawi stand out as countries with especially high levels of rural overrepresentation. Table 4 and frequent demarcations based on fresh censuses (Maundeni and Balule 2004) . Figure 3 shows the share of urban and rural constituencies won by the incumbent party in the first multiparty election recorded in our dataset.
11 Figure 3 shows that the incumbent party was significantly more successful in rural areas than it was in urban constituencies in Zambia, Kenya, Ghana, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. In Tanzania, where the highly dominant CCM party was able to win almost all constituencies in both urban and rural locations, the average victory margin was larger in rural (16%) than urban constituencies (10%). In Gambia, the incumbent party won a clear majority of the seats in both the urban and rural areas. In Zimbabwe and Botswana, the tendency was very clear. Zanu-PF won over 80% of the rural constituencies in the 2005 election. In Botswana, the BDP won 74% of the rural seats, but only a minority of the urban constituencies. In Kenya and Ghana the incumbent parties would have lost their parliamentary majorities if the entire country had voted like the urban areas (Throup and Hornsby 1998) . In Malawi, the incumbent MCP would have been much closer to getting reelected in 1994 if it had managed to win as many urban as rural seats. Zambia's incumbent UNIP party only won 25 out of 150 seats in the 1991 election; of these, only one was urban. The pattern observed above is clear: the ancien regimes relied heavily on rural areas, whereas the opposition parties entering into multipartism were more successful in the cities. These voting-data results confirm the conclusions of earlier survey-based research (ConroyKrutz Forthcoming). 
VI. Malapportionment and incumbent bias: Multivariate analysis
In the theory sections above, we have theorized that rural-biased malapportionment reflects the institutional preferences of ancien regimes that were largely dependent on rural electorates to maintain power. So far, our analysis of malapportionment has been confined to the system (national) level. In this section, we formulate testable hypotheses consistent of our understanding of the extent and origin of malapportionment and ask how electoral district size (electoral apportionment) has correlated with constituencylevel voting patterns over time. Here, we use our dataset of constituency-level electoral 15 In local elections in Senegal in 2009, all major cities (except Ziguinchor) elected opposition candidates. The party quickly abandoned its advocacy for a more proportional electoral system (Mozaffar and Vengroff 2001) .
results since the early 1990s to refine the analysis, examining subnational-level and over time patterns in the data.
We have stipulated that both contemporary apportionment structures and those found at the introduction to multipartyism reflect the political interest of anciens regimes.
Empirically, the last section showed a strong rural bias in apportionment and a striking tendency for anciens regimes to rely predominantly on the support from rural We adopt the following measure to calculate the representation ratio:
Where s c is the share of seats allocated to the constituency c and v c is constituency c 's share of the country's total number of registered voters. A score above 1 would imply that a constituency has a higher share of seats than registered voters and is thus overrepresented, whereas a score below 1 reveals underrepresentation. Our units of analysis are constituencies grouped into countries. Since our units of analysis are constituencies but national level characteristics might affect the dependent variable (i.e., the representation ratio), we estimate a country-fixed effect model. 16 A country-fixed effects model is preferable to, for example, a mixed effects multi-level model because our interest is in variations in apportionment within-rather than between-countries. We therefore do not include country-level correlates in our models. 17 The motivation behind our analysis is very different form the analysis of the correlates of aggregate, nationallevel malapportionment scores, as in Samuels and Snyder (2001) . It is worth mentioning, however, that Samuels and Snyder only found two factors significantly correlated with higher levels of malapportinment in lower house elections: a dummy for Latin America and a dummy for SMD. As all our countries are African SMD systems, we have no variation on these variables within our sample.
To capture the extent to which potential biases have changed over time since 1990
due to redistricting and electoral turnovers, we run our models both for the first and last recorded election in our dataset. 18 For three countries, the Gambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, we are missing data on some of the earlier elections. This problem is, however, mitigated by the fact that none of these countries have experienced electoral turnover.
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Based on the discussion about the political nature of electoral jurisdictions and the pre-democratic origin of rural biased apportionment, we formulate the following hypotheses for the multivariate analysis.
Hypotheses for multivariate analyses of first elections in dataset:
H1: Rural constituencies were over represented for the first election in our dataset.
H2: Constituencies supporting the incumbent party were overrepresented in the first elections.
H3. Constituencies won by the incumbent by a large margin in the first multiparty elections were even more overrepresented than those that were more competitive.
Hypotheses for multivariate analyses of the most recent elections in the dataset:
H4 Rural constituencies remain overrepresented in the most recent election. To test our hypotheses we include a variable in the models accounting for whether a constituency was won by the government (i.e., incumbent) party. The government or incumbent party is defined as the party of the incumbent president.
To identify the rural constituencies we use the method described earlier (see section II). The variable margin of victory measures the difference in vote share (in fractions) obtained by the winner and the runner-up in a constituency. One model also includes an interaction term between government and margin of victory. In models containing the data from the last elections in our data series, we also include a variable accounting for whether a constituency was won by the ancien regime in the first recorded election of our dataset. Adding this variable somewhat decreases the number of observations: due to redistricting, there are some new constituencies and some older constituencies have ceased to exist. Table 2 investigates Hypotheses 1 and 2 and 3 and shows the results from our countryfixed effects OLS regression model, using data from the first election for each country in our dataset. The dependent variable is the representation ratio, or the ratio between a constituency's share of parliamentary seats and its share of the total number of registered voters. Higher representation ratios indicate overrepresentation, while lower numbers imply underrepresentation. Model 1 includes all 8 countries in the dataset. For reasons that will be explained later, model 2 excludes the Tanzanian constituencies. In model 3, the control for urbanness in excluded to see if the coefficient for government support changes when not controlling for the fact that incumbent ancien regimes were stronger in rural areas. Model 4 includes an interaction effect between government support and margin of victory.
VII. Results
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 shows clearly that the patterns of over-and under-representation were not random in Africa's SMD elections at the time of the return to multipartism in the 1990s.The results show that electoral apportionment was structured in a way that magnified incumbents' electoral success. In model 1, the coefficient for government support is insignificant, but this result is driven by the rather specific dynamics of the Tanzanian islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 20 In model 2, we exclude Tanzania, and the coefficient becomes highly significant and positive, supporting the claims in H2, even when controling for urbanness. Given that ancien regimes unilaterally controlled electoral apportionment before the introduction of multipartism, and that some did in fact alter jurisdictions in the run-up to the first multiparty elections, this finding supports our claim that apportionment structures reflected political incentives motivating the anciens regimes.
We also find support in model 4 for H3, which predicts that constituencies won by a large margin by the ancien regime party in multiparty elections of the early 1990s (ie., won by the incumbent or government party at that time) were especially favored by malapportionment (i.e., overrepresented). The interaction effect in model 4 turns out to be highly significant. The results reveal that it was not simply all government-supporting constituencies that were overrepresented around the time of the reintroduction of multiparty competition, but specifically those that returned comfortable victories for the incumbent. Conversely, where constituencies were won by the opposition, high victory margins were negatively, although insignificantly, correlated with over-or under representation. Similarly, when the margin of victory is 0, there is no significant difference in representation between constituencies supporting the opposition and those supporting the incumbent. 21 Figure 5 plots the predicted representation ratio for government and opposition supporting constituencies, conditional on different winning margins for the first multiparty elections in our dataset. Figure 5 shows that the difference in representation ratios between government and opposition constituencies becomes statistically significant when the winning margin exceeds 32%. With the low levels of local competitiveness in our sample, such constituencies are rather common. Model 4 includes 878 constituencies and of these, 416
were won by the incumbent party. In 228 of these (55%), the incumbent party's winning margin exceeded 33%.
These results suggest, that even in control for urbanness, the ancien regime was favored by apportionment structures at the time of the introduction to multipartyism. Rural-bias in apportionment accentuated the incumbent bias in parlimentary representation. The clearest result in table 2 is the importance of urbanness in predicting constituency size (votes-to-seats), supporting our claims in H1. The results show that urban constituencies were significantly less represented than rural constituencies around the time of the reintroduction of multipartism, even when controlling for voting patterns. The significant relationship between the urban/rural status of the constituency and its size is not surprising, given the descriptive statistics shown earlier. As explained in Section II, the models use a broad definition of "urban" that includes all major cities in each country. If we classify only the capital city as "urban" and run the models, the coefficient becomes even larger. When we exclude the "urban" dummy in model 3, the coefficient for incumbent support increases. These results illustrate how the general rural bias in electoral-system apportionment exaggerated the bias in favor of the ancien regime.
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 uses data from the most recent election in our dataset to investigate H4 and H5.
The models in table 3 test whether patterns of apportionment changed as a result of demarcation exercises that took place in the 1990s and 2000s. And because four of the countries in the sample experienced alternations in power, the models in table 4 are a way to study whether newcomer regimes did away with the old rural bias in apportionment that systematically favored the ancien regimes.
In accordance with H4, rural constituencies remain overrepresented in the most recent elections, despite the fact that newcomer regimes have not relied on rural support to the same extent as ancien regimes. Urban constituencies are still significantly larger than their rural counterparts, and are thus underrepresented by prevailing structures of electoral apportionment. In fact, the coefficient for the rural variable is even more positive in model 5 than in model 1 (showing the situation in the first election).
Meanwhile, the coefficient for the government variable is now significantly negative, showing that constituencies supporting incumbents in these latest elections are actually significantly larger than those supporting the opposition (model 5). We, hence, find support for H5. This result seems to be driven by the presence of the newcomer parties. In order not to decrease the number of clusters in the analysis, we did not separate out the newcomer regimes. Yet in three out of the four countries in which newcomer parties came to power, the incumbent regime was disfavored by apportionment in the last election of our dataset. The results remain robust when we exclude the deviant Tanzanian case (models 6 and 7).
To further study the persistence of these institutions and investigate H5 and H6, we introduce a control for whether a constituency was won by the incumbent government The oppositional character of the cities remains a constant feature of African political systems, dating back to the dawn of modern party politics in the 1940s and 1950s (Bates 1981) . The pro-democracy (anti-incumbent) movements of the 1990s were almost exclusively urban-based, as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) pointed out, and in most of Africa, civil society activism remains a largely urban phenomenon to this day (Mamdani 1996) . Control over rural majorities has provided ballast that has helped many ruling parties to withstand the forces of urban opposition.
This analysis has three broad implications for understanding the political character of African states, and how they have been governed since the 1960s. First, it underscores the importance of control over the rural areas in stabilizing African regimes of the post-independence era. This finding raises questions about recent work that suggests that rural support for African incumbents is a dramatic reversal of historical voting patterns (Harding 2010; Conroy-Krutz Forthcoming) .
23
Second, rural bias in electoral apportionment remains a strong feature of these SMD electoral systems. The electoral game has been systematically stacked against the urban areas. Without ambitious new demarcation exercises, average levels of malapportionment are likely to increase into the future because of ongoing processes of urbanization. As our analysis has been confined to SMD systems, there is wide scope for future research that examines and compares these dynamics across and within other systems, and that examines logically-prior questions about political determinants of electoral system choice.
Third, the analysis raises the possibility that rural bias in representation may be consequential in shaping both policy outcomes and electoral practices in the future.
Rural bias may give rulers incentives to create or maintain pro-smallholder agricultural policies, or it may reinforce rulers' incentives (including the incentives of newcomer parties that were hoisted into office by urban supporters) to invest in longstanding forms of rural political brokerage and institutionalized electoral clientelism.
It is highly likely that these dynamics will vary across countries and perhaps subnational units. Important new avenues for research lie in seriously examining the causes and consequences of these uneven patterns of electoral representation. 
